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Abstract
There is strong empirical evidence that countries with lower per capita income tend to
have smaller trade volumes even after controlling for aggregate income. Furthermore, poorer
countries do not just trade less, but have a lower number of trading partners. In this paper, I
construct and estimate a general equilibrium model of trade that captures both these features
of the trade data. There are two novelties in the paper. First, I introduce an association
between market access costs and countriesdevelopment levels, which can account for the
e¤ect of per capita income on trade volumes and explain many zeros in bilateral trade ows.
Secondly, I develop an estimation procedure, which allows me to estimate both variable and
xed costs of trade. I nd that given the estimated parameters, the model performs well in
matching the data. In particular, the predicted trade elasticity with respect to income per
capita is close to that in the data.
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1 Introduction
There is strong empirical evidence suggesting that poorer countries (with lower per capita in-
come) trade less even after controlling for aggregate income (see for example Hummels and
Klenow (2002)). In addition, poorer countries do not just export or import smaller volumes, but
have a fewer number of trading partners. In 1995, for instance, 14% of all country pairs among
the hundred largest countries in terms of GDP did not trade with each other in at least one
direction. Furthermore, among those countries, the fty poorest countries accounted for almost
75% of zero trade ows in the sample. Hence, the country extensive margin (the number of
trading partners) seems to be relevant in explaining the relationship between per capita income
and trade volumes. However, even though a number of quantitative trade models capture the
phenomenon that poor countries trade less, these models usually focus on explaining aggregate
trade volumes and ignore the decomposition of trade volumes into trade margins.
In this paper, I construct and estimate a quantitative general equilibrium model of trade
based on Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) that captures both the relationship between per
capita income and trade volumes and the fact that poorer countries have fewer trading partners.
A core element of the model is an association between the costs of access to foreign markets
and countries development levels. This association is motivated by the evidence suggesting
that rms in poorer countries may face higher entry barriers to foreign markets (which in turn
leads to a larger number of zeros in exports of less developed countries). Indeed, exporting
rms may be required to meet certain product standards, quality requirements, and technical
regulations imposed by the destination country that are especially restrictive for developing and
less developed countries. For instance, studies conducted by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development nd that rms in some developing countries were unable to meet
environmental standards and regulations imposed by developed countries, which in turn resulted
in considerable export losses (see Chen et al. (2006)).1 Poor infrastructure and bureaucracy
1Quality requirements are another entry barrier for rms from developing and less developed countries. The
international management literature emphasizes that one of the key reasons for obtaining quality management
certication (ISO 9000) is the requirements of international customers. For instance, Potoski and Prakash (2009)
argue that ISO certication is a signal for the quality of a product, which is especially important for developing and
less developed countries, as consumers often relate the quality of products to their countries of origin. Meanwhile,
the process of certication is costly. It includes both the costs of development and implementation of new
production processes satisfying the standards and the costs of certication itself (e.g. the costs of application and
documentation review, registrars visits, etc.). Mersha (1997) documents that achieving the quality management
certication is especially complicated in less developed countries (he considers the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa
in particular).
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also play a role of entry barriers for rms in less developed countries. For example, because of
a large number of long administrative procedures and poor logistics services, many rms in less
developed countries cannot meet the reliability requirements of foreign partners and, thereby,
cannot enter foreign markets (see Nordas et al. (2006)).2
I consider an environment where each country is characterized by its population size and
development level. Firms vary according to their productivity, which is dened as the product of
a rm-specic productivity and a country development level. Exporting rms incur variable and
xed costs of trade. I assume that xed costs of trade depend on the development level of the
exporting country and, thereby, vary across countries. I show that if less developed countries
have higher xed costs of trade relative to other costs (the costs of entry into the industry
and xed costs of selling domestically), then, all else equal, they tend to have smaller trade
volumes in equilibrium.3 The assumed relationship between xed costs of trade and countries
development levels also enables us to explain many export zeros in bilateral trade ows. In the
same manner as in Helpman et al. (2008), the model is able to predict zero exports from i
to j: this happens when there are no rms in country i that are productive enough to nd it
protable to export to country j. I show that, other things equal, a country with higher xed
costs of trade (relative to other costs) has a higher export productivity cuto¤ for any export
destination. Hence, if less developed countries have higher relative xed costs of trade, then,
other things equal, they tend to have a lower number of export destinations or, in other words,
a lower number of trading partners.
To examine how well the model ts the data, I estimate the key parameters of the model
using the data for 1995 on bilateral trade ows of the 100 largest countries in terms of total
income. The estimation procedure involves minimizing the sum of squared di¤erences between
the actual bilateral trade ows and those generated by the model subject to the constraint
that the number of zero bilateral trade ows predicted by the model is the same as that in the
data.4 The novelty of this estimation procedure is that it allows us to estimate both variable
2According to the Doing Business (2006) report, there is a signicant negative correlation between the number
of documents required to be lled out before exporting and per capita income of an exporting country: the poorer
a country is, the greater the number of documents exporters of that country have to ll out.
3As usual in trade theory, relative terms are relevant. For instance, it might be the case that a country faces
lower xed costs of trade in absolute terms but trades less, as xed costs of trade are higher relative to other
costs.
4Notice that mismatch is possible. The model can predict some zeros that are not actually observed in the
data and vice versa.
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and xed costs of trade. If we drop the constraint on the zeros, variable and xed costs of trade
are not separately identiable from the bilateral trade data. Furthermore, in contrast to the
reduced form estimation (see for example Helpman et al. (2008)), the procedure accounts for
the general equilibrium features of the model and enables us to examine how well Melitz-type
models perform in explaining the trade data.
After estimating the parameters of the model, I nd that there is a strong correlation between
xed costs of trade predicted by the model and countriesdevelopment levels. Specically, less
developed countries incur higher xed costs of trade and, therefore, tend to have smaller trade
volumes and a lower number of trading partners. The model performs quite well in matching
the data. For instance, in the data, doubling a countrys per capita income (controlling for
the aggregate income) on average leads to a 19% increase in trade on average, while the model
predicts an increase in trade of 22%.5 Given the estimated parameters, the model is able to
explain 35% of export zeros in the data. In other words, 35% of the zeros predicted by the
model are zeros that are actually observed in the data (the rest is mismatch).6 As a comparison,
the exact same model but without the assumed variation in xed costs correctly predicts only
9% of zeros. Hence, the relationship between xed costs of trade and countriesdevelopment
levels matters and helps to explain 26% of export zeros in the data. The estimation strategy
allows us to determine the magnitude of xed costs of trade. Given the estimated parameters,
the aggregate spendings on access to foreign markets constitute on average around half of total
export prots. This nding is very similar to that in Eaton et al. (2008) who estimate the
market access costs using the data on rm-level trade.
Finally, I examine what the welfare gains are if rms in poor countries incur the same xed
costs of trade as their counterparts in rich countries. To conduct this counterfactual, I set the
xed costs of trade of all countries equal to the estimated value of those in the U.S. (the other
parameters of the model are set equal to their estimated values). I nd that in this case, welfare
in all countries rises with the average percentage change equal to 17% and larger gains for smaller
and poorer countries. In particular, the real income inequality (measured as the ratio of the
average real income of the ten richest countries to that of the ten poorest countries) falls by
28%.
The present paper is not the only one to explore the relationship between countrys trade
5By trade, I mean the average between exports and imports.
6Remember that the estimation procedure implies that given the estimated parameters, the model predicts
the same number of zeros as that in the data.
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costs and per capita income. Waugh (2009) considers a general equilibrium model of trade based
on Eaton and Kortum (2002). He assumes that variable trade costs are a function of symmetric
relationships (e.g., distance, etc.) and an exporter xed e¤ect. He nds a negative correlation
between exporter per capita income and the xed e¤ect, implying that poor countries face higher
variable trade costs than rich countries. In contrast to Waugh (2009), the present model allows
us to consider the cross-country variation in both variable and xed costs of trade.7 In particular,
I nd that the model with the variation only in variable costs (xed costs are assumed to be
identical across countries) performs worse in matching the data than the benchmark model (with
the variation only in xed costs).8
A broad strand of the literature considers nonhomotheticity of consumer preferences as a
main driving force of the relationship between per capita income and trade volumes. A signi-
cant step in this direction is Fieler (2009), who extends the Ricardian model of trade in Eaton
and Kortum (2002) by allowing for nonhomothetic preferences and cross-sector di¤erences in
production technologies.9 The present paper provides another, possibly complimentary, expla-
nation of why poorer countries trade less, which is not based on nonhomotheticity of preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts
of the model and describes the equilibrium. Section 3 presents the main theoretical ndings
of the model and derives their implications for trade volumes. Section 4 estimates the model
and explores its quantitative implications. Section 5 conducts counterfactual analysis. Section
6 examines the quantitative implications of alternative specications of the model. Section 7
concludes.
2 Theory
I consider a variation of the Melitz model extended to a world with N asymmetric countries.
Each country is characterized by its population size and development level. The only factor of
production is labor, which is inelastically supplied by agents endowed with one unit of labor each.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive heterogenous rms producing di¤erent
7Since Waugh (2009) considers a perfectly competitive environment, there are no xed costs of trade in his
model.
8By the variation in trade costs, I mean the relationship between trade costs and countriesdevelopment levels.
Specically, we can assume that variable costs of trade also depend on the exporter development level (see Section
6 for details).
9See also Flam and Helpman (1987), Hunter (1991), Markusen (1986), Matsuyama (2000), Mitra and Trindade
(2005), and Stokey (1991).
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varieties of a di¤erentiated good. Without loss of generality, I assume that agents own equal
shares of all rms.10 Hence, consumers in country j have identical incomes (which can vary
across countries) consisting of labor income wj and the share of rmsprots j .
2.1 Consumption
I assume that consumers have identical homothetic preferences that take the constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) form. In particular, a representative consumer in country j maximizes
Qj =
 Z
!2
j
q
 1

j (!)d!
! 
 1
(1)
subject to Z
!2
j
pj(!)qj(!)d! = (wj + j)Lj , (2)
where 
j is the set of available varieties in country j, qj(!) is quantity consumed, pj(!) is the
price of variety ! in country j, Lj is the population size of country j, and  > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between varieties. This maximization problem yields that
qj(!) =

pj(!)
Pj
  (wj + j)Lj
Pj
,
where Pj =
R
!2
j p
1 
j (!)d!
 1
1 
is the CES price index: i.e., PjQj = (wj + j)Lj .
2.2 Production
Production in each country is represented by an average industry with free entry into the indus-
try. To enter the industry in country i, ex-ante identical rms have to make sunk investments
fei associated with the creation of a new variety. Once a rm incurs the costs of entry, it obtains
a draw  of its rm-specic productivity from a distribution G() with the support on [L, H ].
This distribution is common for all rms in all countries. Ex post, rms vary by their productiv-
ities, which are the product of a rm-specic productivity  and the country development level
Zi. Hence, both population size Li and development level Zi could a¤ect equilibrium outcomes
for country i.
The price of variety ! sold in country j, pj(!), is determined by the productivity of the rm
producing this variety, its country of origin, and the destination market. Therefore, hereafter
10A more general assumption is that each agent owns a balanced portfolio of shares of all rms. However, due
to free entry, the total prots of all rms are equal to zero in equilibrium. This implies that the value of any
balanced portfolio is equal to zero. Therefore, to simplify the notation, I assume that agents have equal shares of
all rms.
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I omit the notation of ! and use pij() instead of pj(!). We dene ij() as the variable
prots from exporting to country j of the rm, which produces in country i with rm-specic
productivity . Then,
ij() =

pij()  wi
Zi
 ij


pij()
Pj
  (wj + j)Lj
Pj
; (3)
where pij() solves the following maximization problem:
max
p0

p  wi
Zi
 ij


p . (4)
Here  ij stands for variable trade costs between country i and j, which take Samuelsons iceberg
form. I set  ii to unity and assume that the triangle inequality holds for any  ij : i.e.,  ij   ikkj
for any i, j, and k.11
The pricing rule maximizing (4) is as follows:
pij() =
wi
Zi
 ij


(   1) . (5)
Consequently, the variable prots ij() are given by
ij() = C

Zi
wi ij
 1 (wj + j)Lj
P 1 j
 1, (6)
where C = 1
 
 1

 1
.
To export from country i to country j, rms have to pay xed costs fij representing the costs
of serving market j.12 The presence of xed costs implies that not all rms nd it protable
to export or sell at home. Firms with relatively low productivities exit because of negative
potential prots. In particular, rms located in country i with  < ij decide not to export to
country j, where the cuto¤ ij is determined by
ij(ij) = fij :
The last expression implies that the cuto¤ ij is given by
ij =
wi
Zi
 ij
 
1
C
P 1 j
(wj + j)Lj
! 1
 1
f
1
 1
ij . (7)
11The triangle inequality guarantees that it is cheaper to deliver goods from country i directly to country j,
rather than to use another country as an intermediary.
12The xed costs of selling at home are fii.
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Higher ij means that fewer rms based in country i nd it protable to export to country j.
In particular, if ij > H , then no rm exports from country i to country j resulting in zero
exports from i to j.
We dene rij() as the revenues received from exporting to country j by a rm with  located
in country i. Then,
rij() = C

Zi
wi ij
 1 (wj + j)Lj
P 1 j
 1. (8)
As a result, the total value of exports from country i to country j, Xij , is given by
Xij =Mei
Z H
ij
rij()dG(), (9)
where Mei is the mass of entrants into the industry.13 Since there are MeidG() rms with
productivity  in country i, the measure of available varieties in country j is equal to:
 (
j) =
PN
i=1Mei (1 G (ij)) :
2.3 Market Access Costs and Costs of Entry
I assume that the xed costs of serving a certain market are subdivided into two parts: costs
directly associated with serving the market (for instance, the construction of facilities) and costs
associated with access to the market (for instance, satisfying product standards and quality
requirements of the destination country). Furthermore, I assume that domestic rms pay only
the former, while foreign rms pay both. Hence, the functional form for the xed costs of
exporting is as follows:
fij =
(
wifd + wi
fx
Zi
, if j 6= i,
wifd, otherwise,
(10)
where fd and fx are common for all countries. The parameter  describes how the country
development level Zi a¤ects the xed costs of exporting. If  is greater (less) than zero, then
more developed countries use fewer (more) units of labor to access foreign markets.
13Note that the mass of rms based in country i and serving market j is equal to Mij = Mei (1 G(ij)). In
this manner, the expression (9) can be rewritten as
Xij =Mij
Z H
ij
rij()d
G()
1 G(ij) ;
where G()
1 G(ij) is the distribution of rm-specic productivities conditional on   ij .
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This way of representing xed costs of trade is one of the key points in the paper. Melitz
(2003) considers trade between symmetric countries, so xed costs are the same for all countries.
Chaney (2008) explores the Melitz framework with many asymmetric countries. However, he
does not impose any particular relationship or structure on xed costs of trade.
In the present paper, it is assumed that xed costs of exporting depend only on exporter
characteristics. Meanwhile, Arkolakis (2008) and Eaton et al. (2008) argue that the costs of
access to foreign markets depend on the characteristics of the destination market as well. For
instance, Arkolakis (2008) relates xed costs of exporting to product advertising requiring labor
services from both source and destination countries. In Section 6, I consider alternative speci-
cations of the model, which include the dependence of xed costs on the importer development
level.
Finally, I assume that the costs of entry into the industry are given by
fei = wife for all i, (11)
where fe is common for all countries.
2.4 Equilibrium
Given the set of parameters f fd, fx, , fe,  ij , , G(), Zi, Ligi;j=1::N , the equilibrium in the
model is dened by fpij (), Pi, Mei, ij , wigi;j=1::N such that
1) fpij ()gi;j=1::N are determined by the rm maximization problem (see (5)).
2) fPigi=1::N satisfy the following equation:
Pi =
Z
!2
i
p1 i (!)d!
 1
1 
,
which is equivalent to
P 1 i =
PN
j=1Mej
Z H
ji
p1 ji ()dG().
3) Expected prots of a given rm are equal to zero, meaning that
fei =
NX
j=1
Pr (  ij)E ((ij()  fij) j  ij) .
4) fijgi;j=1::N satisfy the zero prot condition (see (7)).
5) Trade is balanced, implying that
NX
j=1
Mei
Z H
ij
rij()dG() =
NX
j=1
Mej
Z H
ji
rji()dG().
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Note that the set fwi; Pi, Meigi=1::N is su¢ cient to determine all other endogenous variables
in the model such as pij (), ij(), rij(), and ij . This implies that to nd the equilibrium in
the model, we need to nd the set fwi; Pi, Meigi=1::N , which satises the following system of
equations: 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
P 1 i =
PN
j=1Mej
R H
ji
p1 ji ()dG();
fei =
PN
j=1 Pr (  ij)E ((ij()  fij) j  ij) ;PN
j=1Mei
R H
ij
rij()dG() =
PN
j=1Mej
R H
ji
rji()dG(),
(12)
where pij (), ij(), rij(), and ij are expressed in terms of fwi; Pi, Meigi=1::N and the pa-
rameters of the model. Thus, we have the system of 3N equations with 3N unknowns, fwi;
Pi, Meigi=1::N . Consequently, taking wN as numeraire, we can solve the system and nd the
endogenous variables for any given set of the parameters.
3 Per Capita Income and Trade Volumes
In the equilibrium, the total income of country i is given by wiLi, where wi is a function of both
Zi and Li (and the other parameters of the model).14 It is straightforward to show that all else
equal, more developed countries (with higher Zi) tend to have higher total income. This in turn
means that there is a positive correlation between per capita income wi and development level
Zi.
In this section, I compare trade volumes of two countries with identical total incomes but
di¤erent components, per capita income and population size, within a given equilibrium. This
way of conducting comparative statics corresponds to a cross-country comparison in the data.
In particular, I consider such an equilibrium that there are two countries, 1 and 2; which are
identical in every way except for Zi and Li. Furthermore, I assume that Z1, Z2, L1, and L2
are such that Z1 > Z2, L1 < L2, and w1L1 = w2L2 in the equilibrium.15 In this way, I restrict
countries 1 and 2 to have the same size of economy but di¤erent per capita incomes: country 1
is richer and smaller, while country 2 is poorer and larger.
To capture only the e¤ects of Zi and Li on trade volumes, I assume that the countries are
geographically symmetric and have identical trading partners. Namely, I assume that 1j = 2j
14Recall that free entry into the industry leads to zero total prots: i.e., i = 0 for all i = 1::N . This means
that the total income in country i equals to wiLi.
15Note that since higher Zi implies higher wi, we can always nd such values of Z1 and Z2 that w1L1 = w2L2
in the equilibrium.
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and  j1 =  j2 for all j > 2. In addition, I assume that trade costs between country 1 and 2 are
so high that the countries do not trade with each other in the equilibrium. For instance, we can
think that country 1 is located at the North Pole, country 2 is located at the South Pole, while
the rest of the world is located along the equator. Note that this approach of analyzing the
e¤ects of Zi and Li is equivalent to a standard comparative statics exercise (where we compare
equilibrium outcomes before and after a change in a parameter) applied to a small open economy.
I show that if  is greater than zero, then the richer country has greater trade volumes in
the equilibrium. The intuition behind this result goes as follows. As Z1 > Z2, for all j > 2,
f1j
fe1
<
f2j
fe2
. (13)
In words, it is relatively less expensive to export than to create a new variety in country 1. As a
result, country 1 has lower mass of entrants into the industry but a higher number of exporting
rms relative to the mass of entrants. Furthermore, for all j > 2,
f1j
f11
<
f2j
f22
. (14)
That is, country 1 has lower xed costs of trade relative to xed costs of selling domestically.
This implies that country 1 has a higher number of exporting rms not only relative to the mass
of entrants, but also relative to the number of rms serving the domestic market. This in turn
leads to greater trade volumes in country 1.16
Notice that as usual in trade theory, relative terms matter. It might be the case that a
country faces lower xed costs of trade in absolute terms but trades less, as xed costs of
trade are higher relative to the other costs. While the intuition is straightforward, the proof
is quite complex. This is due to the di¢ culty of obtaining analytical results in the presence of
asymmetries in Melitz type models. To prove this claim, I make two assumptions.
Assumption 1: 
g()R H
 t
 1dG(t)
is weakly increasing in , where g() is the density function
associated with G().
16 It might seem that the inequality in (14) is su¢ cient for country 1 to have greater trade volumes and (13) is
redundant. However, it is not true. Suppose that xed costs of selling domestically are su¢ ciently low and all
entrants in both countries nd it protable to sell at home. That is, the equilibrium values of 11 and 22 are
less than L. Then, having a higher number of exporting rms relative to the number of rms selling at home
is equivalent to having a higher number of exporting rms relative to the mass of entrants. Hence, we need (13)
to show that country 1 has greater trade volumes. Moreover, by continuity, this example can be extended to the
case when the equilibrium values of 11 and 22 lie in some right neighborhood of L.
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This assumption has a natural interpretation. It implies that g() does not decrease too fast;
i.e., the probability of getting higher values of  does not decrease too fast with . For instance,
a truncated Pareto distribution or a power distribution satises this condition.
Assumption 2: Trade costs are so high that 1j  11 and 2j  22 for all j > 2.
This is a standard assumption in trade literature, saying that exporting rms serve the home
market as well. It is consistent with empirical evidence: only a small fraction of rms export
and those that export also sell domestically.
Proposition 1 If  > 0 and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then country 1 has greater trade volumes
in equilibrium.
Proof. See the proof in Appendix A.
Note that in general, we can assume that the costs of entry into the industry and selling at
home also depend on the country development level. This would not change the main ndings
above (except the condition on ), as we need di¤erences in relative terms. In the paper, I do
not introduce this dependence, as it is not identiable from the trade data.
4 Estimation
To understand the contribution of the imposed association between the market access costs and
the development levels in explaining the trade data, I estimate the key parameters of the model.
In the estimation procedure, I use data on total income, population, bilateral trade ows, and
cultural and geographical barriers between country pairs for 1995. I consider the sample of
the hundred largest countries in terms of GDP, for which the data sets are complete.17 These
countries account for 91:6% of world trade in 1995. I assume that the other countries do not
exist (these hundred countries constitute the entire world). Exports to non-existent countries
are considered as domestic sales.
Data on total income and population are taken from the World Bank (2007). Table 13
reports the list of the countries in the sample arranged by the size of GDP. Data on bilateral
17Because of entrepot trade, which is not captured by my model, I consider Belgium and Luxemburg as well as
China, Hong-Hong, and Macao as one country. There are two outliers in the sample: Malaysia and Singapore.
These countries have trade volumes greater than their total incomes (due to entrepot trade). However, their
e¤ect on the parameter estimates is negligible. Removing these countries from the sample does not change the
estimation results.
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trade ows comes from the United Nation Statistics Division (2007).18 In constructing bilateral
trade ows, I follow Feenstra et al. (2005). As a measure of trade volumes between countries, I
use trade values reported by the importing country, as they tend to be more precise than those
reported by the exporter. However, if an importer report is not available, I use the corresponding
exporter report instead. There are 1399 export zeros in the sample, which constitutes 14% of
the total number of bilateral trade ows.
As potential trade barriers, I consider distance, the e¤ects of common border and language,
and the impact of membership in free trade areas.19 Hence, for each country pair we need
data on whether these countries have a common language or share a common border plus data
on distance between them.20 I take these data sets from the Centre dEtudes Prospectives
et dInformations Internationales (2005). In addition, I use the data on whether the pair of
countries belongs to the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Union
(EU).
Figure 1 displays the relationship in the data between the log of trade volumes (the average
between exports and imports) and the log of GDP . As is evident from the gure, there is a
strong positive correlation between countriestrade volumes and total income. This is in line
with the previous empirical studies on the gravity equation. Figure 2 depicts the relationship
between the residuals and countries logs of income per capita and population size. As it is
inferred from the gure, there is a signicant positive correlation between the residuals and
income per capita. This suggests that conditional on GDP , richer countries trade more.
4.1 Parametrization
To estimate the model, we need to parametrize the distribution of rm-specic productivity
draws G() and variable trade costs  ij . In parametrizing G(), I follow a number of studies
using a truncated Pareto distribution to describe the distribution of rm productivities.21 In
18An alternative source for data on trade ows is the NBER-UN data set constructed by Feenstra et al. (2005).
However, this data set includes only trade ows in a certain category with values greater than $100.000 per
year. When aggregating, this may potentially lead to underestimation of aggregate exports and imports and
overestimation of the number of zero trade ows.
19Many other variables (for instance, religion or colonial origin) can be used as additional measures of trade
barriers between countries. However, to reduce the number of parameters I need to estimate, I consider only
language, border, distance, and membership in free trade areas.
20By distance between two countries, I mean the distance between the main cities in the countries. Usually,
the main city is the capital. However, in some cases, the capital is not populated enough to serve a role of the
economic center of the country. In these cases, the most populated city represents the country.
21See e.g. Helpman et al. (2008) or Johnson (2007).
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particular, I assume that
G() =
1
kL
  1
k
1
kL
  1
kH
on [L; H ], (15)
where 1  H > L > 0 and k >    1. The last condition guarantees that in the case when
H =1, the integral
R H
ij
 1dG() exists.
I assume the following functional form for variable trade costs:
 ij = 1 + 0D
1
ij 
Bij
2 
LNGij
3 
NAFij
4 
EUij
5 for j 6= i, (16)
where f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g is the set of parameters describing variable costs of trade. Dij is the
distance between countries i and j, Bij and LNGij are dummy variables for common border and
language, and NAFij and EUij are dummy variables for whether countries i and j are members
of NAFTA or EU, respectively. For instance, if 2 is less (greater) than one, then sharing a
common border reduces (increases) the costs of trade between countries.
Hence, the set of parameters of the model is given by
f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; fx; ; fe; fd; ; k; L; Hg . (17)
Note that a number of parameters in (17), namely ffe; fd; ; k; L; Hg, are not identiable from
the trade data (i.e., the t of the data does not vary as you change them). Therefore, I x these
parameters at values consistent with other work.
In xing , I follow the results in the previous studies estimating the elasticity of substitution.
Bernard et al. (2003) argue that  equal to 3:8 captures the export behavior of the U.S.
plants best. Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate the elasticity of substitution for di¤erent
aggregation levels. In period 1990-2001 for SITC-3 aggregation level, the estimates vary from
1:2 (thermionic, cold cathode, photocathode valves, etc.) to 22:1 (crude oil from petroleum or
bituminous minerals) with the mean equal to 4. The number obtained in Bernard et al. (2003)
is close to the mean of the estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006). Following their results, I
set  equal to 3:8.
The distribution of productivity draws in (15) is characterized by parameters L, H , and k.
I normalize L to unity. In many studies, to simplify analytical derivations H is set to innity.22
However, setting H to innity implies that there always exist some relatively productive rms
nding it protable to export to any country. This means that the model will not generate
22See for example Chaney (2008).
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Table 1: The Values Assigned to the Unidentiable Parameters
Parameter Value
Elasticity of substitution,  3:8
Shape parameter, k 3:4
Lower support, L 1
Upper support, H 20
Fixed costs of selling at home, fd 0
Costs of entry, fe 1
export zeros, which is at odds with the data. In the paper, I set H equal to 20. On the one
hand, nite H allows for zero bilateral ows. On the other hand, there is not much di¤erence in
terms of the statistics of the productivity distribution (such as average, variance, etc.) between
H = 20 and H =1. That is, the choice of H is mainly consistent with the previous studies
and allows for export zeros. The shape parameter k determines the behavior of the tail of the
rm-specic productivity distribution. Following Ghironi and Melitz (2004) and Bernard et al.
(2007), I set k equal to 3:4.
Following Helpman et al. (2008), I set fd equal to zero so that there are no xed costs of
selling domestically, implying that all entering rms serve the home market. Finally, as changes
in the parameter fe only rescale the mass of entrants into the industry and have no impact on
trade volumes, I normalize fe to unity.23
Hereafter, I assume that the set of parameters ffe; fd; ; k; L; Hg is xed at the values
reported in Table 1. In Appendix B, I do several robustness checks by trying some other
parameter values. I nd that changes in the values do not substantially alter the quantitative
implications of the model.
4.2 Estimation Procedure
The rest of the parameters is given by  = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; fx; g. To estimate these
parameters, I use a restricted non-linear least squares procedure. For given  and fZi; Ligi=1::N ,
we can solve the system of equations (12) and nd the equilibrium values of fwi, Pi, Meigi=1::N
23The condition (28) implies that any changes in fij and fei keeping
fij
fei
xed for all j do not a¤ect the cuto¤s
ij and, therefore, trade volumes.
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(notice that if we know , we can construct f ijgi;j=1::N using (16)). Let Xij(Z;L;) denote
the value of exports from country i to j generated by the model conditional on , fZi; Ligi=1::N ,
and the corresponding equilibrium values of fwi, Pi, Meigi=1::N (here Z = fZigi=1::N and
L = fLigi=1::N ). In words, if we know the parameters of the model and the exogenous variables
Z and L, we can solve for the equilibrium and construct the corresponding bilateral trade ows.
To estimate , I solve the following minimization problem:
min

P
i;j:i6=j
 
Xoij  Xij(Z;L;)
2 (18)
subject to
	(Z;L;) = 0, (19)
where Xoij is the value of exports from i to j observed in the data. 	(Z;L;) stands for the
di¤erence between the number of zeros predicted by the model (given  and fZi; Ligi=1::N ) and
the actual number of zero bilateral trade ows in the data (the "actual" zeros).24 This estimation
technique also allows to account for the general equilibrium features of the model (including the
e¤ects of free entry into the industry) and to use the information contained in export zeros. The
restriction (19) is imposed for identication purposes. In particular, the variable and xed costs
of trade are not separately identiable from just bilateral trade data. Any changes in fx can be
o¤set by proper changes in f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; g without a¤ecting the value of the objective
function in (18).
The estimation procedure discussed above is based on the fact that we know the values of
fZi; Ligi=1::N . While for fLigi=1::N we can use the data on population size in the countries,
24The estimation procedure implies that the model ts just the number of zeros. However, it is possible that
the model generates zeros that are not actually observed in the data and vice versa. Therefore, we can decompose
	(Z;L;) into the sum of two terms:
	(Z;L;) = 	T (Z;L;) + 	F (Z;L;) : (20)
In (20), 	T (Z;L;) is the di¤erence between the number of correctly predicted zeros (zeros predicted by the
model and observed in the data) and the number of "actual" zeros, while 	F (Z;L;) is the mismatch (zeros
that are predicted by the model but not observed in the data). Hence, the restriction (19) implies that equal
weights are attached to 	T (Z;L;) and 	F (Z;L;). In Appendix C, I examine alternative restrictions in the
minimization problem. In particular, I consider the following restriction:
(1  ")	T (Z;L;) + "	F (Z;L;) = 0,
where " 2 [0; 1] represents a certain weight attached to the mismatch. For instance, if " is equal to zero, then the
mismatch is of no importance and, as a result, the model predicts all the zeros in the data plus some others. If "
is equal to unity, then we only care about the mismatch. All zeros generated by the model match the zeros in the
data. Notice that if " is equal to 0:5, then we obtain the restriction in (20). In the Appendix, I consider " equal
to 0:25 and 0:75. I nd that changes in " a¤ect the implications of the model regarding zeros only (see Appendix
C for details).
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fZigi=1::N are not observable. To resolve this problem, I use the data on per capita income
levels to reconstruct fZigi=1::N . Specically, from the equilibrium conditions (12) we have that
w = w(Z;L;), where w = fwigi=1::N . This implies that we can express Z in terms of w, L, and
the parameters . That is, we can invert the function w(Z;L;) and obtain Z = Z(w;L;).25
In the model, wi is equal to per capita income in country i, which is observed in the data. Hence,
using the data for fwigi=1::N we can reconstruct fZigi=1::N . In this case, the minimization
problem can be rewritten as follows:
min

P
i;j:i6=j
 
Xoij  Xij(Z(w;L;); L;)
2 (21)
subject to
	(Z(w;L;); L;) = 0. (22)
Note that the structure of the equations in (12) is nonlinear. This implies that the function
w(Z;L;) is not necessarily one-to-one. For instance, several di¤erent values of Z may lead to
the same value of w. However, no such examples occur in the numerical analysis I conduct in
the paper.
Notice that in the model, Li can be interpreted not only as population size in country i, but
also as the size of labor force in that country. In the paper, I use the data on population sizes
to construct fLigi=1::N , while I also estimate the model using the data on the size of labor force
in the countries. I nd that the results do not substantially di¤er from those obtained in the
paper.
In Appendix D, as a robustness check I consider alternative estimation procedures such as
non-linear least deviations and non-linear least squares applied to logarithms rather than levels.
I nd that these estimation procedures yield similar predictions as the procedure used in the
paper.
4.3 Results
As a measure of the explanatory power of the model, I use
R2 = 1 
P
i;j:i6=j

Xoij  Xij(Z(w;L;); L;)
2
P
i;j:i6=j

Xoij
2 .
The explanatory power is 100%, if we are able to t perfectly all bilateral trade ows: i.e.,P
i;j:i6=j

Xoij  Xij(Z(w;L;); L;)
2
= 0.
25ZUSA is normalized to unity.
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Table 2 reports the results obtained from solving (21) subject to (22).26 The explanatory
power of the model is 81%. Like in traditional estimates of the gravity equation, the results
show that country i and j trade more if they are closer to each other, have a common border,
share a common language, or belong to the same regional trade agreement (NAFTA or EU). The
estimated value of  is 0:67, implying a strong correlation between country development level
and market access costs. More developed countries tend to have lower xed costs of exporting
relative to the other costs.
To compare the quantitative implications of the model with the data, I run the following
regression (robust standard errors in parentheses):
ln
Ti
Ti(^)
=  1:23
(0:09)
+ 0:16
(0:03)
lnGDPi   0:04
(0:04)
ln
GDPi
Li
, (23)
where Ti is the actual trade volumes of country i and Ti(^) is the volumes of trade generated by
the model given the estimated values of the parameters (see Table 2). As we can see from (23), the
model captures the e¤ect of per capita income on trade volumes (conditional on total income)
quite well. The corresponding coe¢ cient is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Meanwhile,
the estimates in (23) suggest that the model somewhat underestimates trade volumes of large
population countries. Table 3 reports the elasticities of trade with respect to total and per
capita incomes observed in the data and generated by the model (the rst and second columns,
respectively). In the data, doubling a country income per capita (keeping the total income
unaltered) leads on average to an increase in trade volumes of 19% and doubling a country
population size raises trade volumes by 85%. The model predicts a rise in trade volumes of 22%
and 69%, respectively.
Recall that the restriction (22) in the estimation procedure implies that the number of
zero bilateral trade ows generated by the model is the same as that in the data. As it was
discussed above, mismatch is possible. I nd that the model explains 35% of the zeros in the
data. That is, 35% of zeros generated by the model match the zeros observed in the data, while
the rest is mismatch. The key point is that the model underestimates trade volumes of large
population countries. As a result, it generates a number of "false" zeros among countries with
large population and does not predict many zeros in the data among small population countries.
Notice that the estimated association between a country development level and xed costs of
trade helps to explain many zeros in the data. In the next subsection, I estimate a variation of
26 I do not report the asymptotic errors, as it is extremely hard to explore the asymptotic properties of the
obtained estimate.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates
0 1 2 3 4 5 fx  R
2
0:49 0:14 0:76 0:97 0:78 0:94 2:15 0:67 81%
the model when  is equal to zero: i.e., xed costs of trade (in terms of labor units) are identical
across the countries. I nd that in this case, the mismatch constitutes 91%.
The estimated values of the parameters also allow us to determine the magnitude of xed
costs of trade. For each country I construct the ratio of the aggregate xed costs of exporting
to the aggregate export prots, which is given by
FCRi =
Mei
PN
j 6=i (1 G(ij)) fij
Mei
PN
j 6=i
R H
ij
ij()dG()
.
The ratios vary from 0:32 (for Iceland) to 0:64 (for India) with the mean equal to 0:45. That
is, the total costs of access to foreign markets constitute on average around the half of the total
export prots. The similar result is obtained in Eaton et al. (2008), who nd that the share of
xed costs in the gross prots is a little more than half. By regressing the log of FCRi on the
logs of GDP and GDP per capita, I nd that richer countries have the lower share of xed costs
of exporting in the total export prots, while countries with larger population have the higher
share. Namely,
lnFCRi =  0:84
(0:01)
+ 0:04
(0:003)
lnGDPi   0:14
(0:002)
ln
GDPi
Li
. (24)
In the next subsection, I estimate the model when  is equal to zero and compare the
quantitative implications of that model with those obtained above.
4.3.1 Identical Market Access Costs: Comparison
If  is equal to zero, then
fij = wifx for i 6= j,
implying identical xed costs of trade (in terms of labor) across countries. Since I x  at zero,
the set of parameters estimated is f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; fxg.
Table 4 reports the estimated values of the parameters. The explanatory power of the model
falls from 81% to 73%. Hence, di¤erences in xed costs of trade established in the model explain
8% of the variation in the bilateral trade ows. The third column of Table 3 shows the trade
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Table 3: Trade Elasticities and Zeros
Estimator:
Dependent variable:
Data (OLS)
lnTi
Model (OLS,  > 0)
lnTi(^)
Model (OLS,  = 0)
lnTi(^)
Log of GDP
0:85
(0:03)
0:69
(0:03)
0:76
(0:03)
Log of GDP per capita
0:19
(0:04)
0:22
(0:02)
0:04
(0:02)
Correctly predicted zeros: 100% 35% 9%
Observations: 100 100 100
Table 4: Parameter Estimates (=0)
0 1 2 3 4 5 fx  R
2
0:04 0:31 0:75 0:82 0:72 1:06 122:7 0 73%
elasticities generated by the model with  equal to zero. As it can be seen from the table, the
model does slightly better in predicting trade volumes of large population countries. Doubling
a country population size raises trade volumes by 76% compared to an increase of 85% in the
data. However, the e¤ect of per capita income on trade volumes is signicantly lower than that
in the data. Conditional on the total income, doubling a country income per capita leads on
average to an increase in trade volumes of 4%, while the e¤ect observed in the data is 19%.27
Finally, the percentage of correctly predicted zeros is 9%. This constitutes the mismatch of
91%, which is substantially greater than the mismatch obtained in the case when xed costs of
exporting depend on a country development level.
27The positive and signicant (at the 5% signicance level) e¤ect of per capita income on trade volumes in the
model with  = 0 is explained by some correlation between the estimated trade barriers (distance, border, etc.)
and per capita income levels. That is, some small part of the e¤ect of per capita income can be explained by
the geographical location of a country, its membership in the trade unions, or its cultural characteristics such as
language.
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5 Eliminating Asymmetries in Trade Costs
In this section, I use the estimated model to explore how the elimination of asymmetries in xed
costs of trade a¤ects consumer welfare across countries. Specically, I consider an experiment
where  falls from 0:67 (the estimated value of ) to zero and examine the corresponding changes
in consumer welfare. Remember that setting  to zero removes the relationship between market
access costs and development levels and, therefore, leads to symmetric xed costs of trade:
fij = wifx for i 6= j. The other parameters including Z are xed at the values obtained from
the benchmark estimation procedure (see Table 2).
Consumer welfare in country i (denoted as Wi) is equal to the real wage in that country.
Namely, for i = 1::N
Wi  Qi
Li
=
wi
Pi
: (25)
Hence, given the parameters of the model, we can solve (12) for fwi; Pi;Meigi=1::N and then
using (25), nd the equilibrium value of consumer welfare in country i. Let us denote 4WiWi as
the percentage change in welfare in country i given the changes in the parameters of the model.
That is,
4Wi
Wi
=
W afteri
W beforei
  1,
where W beforei is the equilibrium value of welfare when the parameters are equal to their esti-
mated values and W afteri is welfare when  is equal to zero (recall that the other parameters
remain unchanged).
I nd that all countries gain from the elimination of asymmetries in market access costs with
the average percentage change in welfare being equal to 17%. The next regression illustrates
how the gains depend on country characteristics. In particular, I regress 4WiWi on the logs of
GDPi and GDPiLi : 4Wi
Wi
= 0:35
(0:01)
  0:03
(0:005)
lnGDPi   0:05
(0:005)
ln
GDPi
Li
. (26)
As it can be seen, doubling a country population size on average reduces the welfare gains
by 3%, while doubling a country per capita income (controlling for the total income of that
country) reduces the gains by 5%. The former e¤ect is explained by the fact that setting  to
zero enhances trade in all countries. Since countries with larger population tend to have a lower
trade to GDP ratio, those countries gain less compared to small population countries. The
latter e¤ect is based on the feature of the model that xed costs of trade depend on country
20
development level: i.e., rms in less developed countries face higher market access costs. Since
xing  at zero eliminates this relationship, the changes in welfare are more substantial for less
developed countries. I also nd that removing asymmetries in xed costs of trade dramatically
reduces the number of zero bilateral trade ows. In the new equilibrium (after setting  to zero),
there are only 4 export zeros in comparison with 1399 zeros when  is equal to 0:67.
The ndings above suggest that eliminating asymmetries in xed costs of trade not only
raises consumer welfare, but also reduces welfare inequality across countries (as poor countries
gain relatively more). In particular, as a measure of the welfare inequality in the model, I
consider the ratio of the average income of the ten richest (in real terms) countries to that of
the ten poorest countries. I nd that setting  to zero reduces the measured welfare inequality
by 28%.
6 Alternative Specications
In this section, I consider two alternative specications of the model. First, I assume that xed
costs of trade depend on both exporters and importers development levels. Second, I examine
the case when variable costs of trade depend on exporters development level, while xed costs
of trade are identical across countries.
In the paper, xed costs of trade depend only on characteristics of an exporting country.
Meanwhile, Arkolakis (2008) emphasizes that to serve a foreign market rms may need labor
services from both the source and the destination countries. Eaton et al. (2008) assume that
market access costs depend only on importer characteristics. To account for the importer e¤ect
on xed costs, I assume that
fij =
wi
Zi
Zj fx for i 6= j.
That is, xed costs of exporting depend on importers development level as well. I then estimate
the model applying the same estimation procedure as before. The set of the parameters I
estimate is given by f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; fx; ; g.
The second column in Table 5 shows the estimates of the parameters (the rst column
reports the estimates obtained in the benchmark case). As it can be inferred, there is a negative
correlation between the importer development level and the xed costs of trade. The estimate of
 is  0:09 implying that it is relatively easier to export to more developed countries. However,
the impact of the importer development level on the xed costs is substantially lower than that
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Table 5: Alternative Specications: Parameter Estimates
Specications: (1) (2) (3)
0 0:49 0:52 0:28
1 0:14 0:14 0:16
2 0:76 0:77 0:72
3 0:97 0:97 0:99
4 0:78 0:78 0:72
5 0:94 0:94 0:94
fx 2:15 1:67 15:88
 0:67 0:62  
    0:09  
     0:22
R2 81% 81% 79%
of the exporter development level. The presence of the importer e¤ect does not considerably
a¤ect the estimates of the other parameters and does not improve the explanatory power of the
model. This suggests that the importer e¤ect does not contribute a lot in explaining the bilateral
trade ows. The third column in Table 6 reports the trade elasticities and the percentage of
zeros correctly predicted by the model. As it can be seen, the presence of the importer e¤ect
does not signicantly change the trade elasticities and slightly improves the ability of the model
to match zeros in the data.
In his paper, Waugh (2009) assumes that variable trade costs are a function of symmetric
relationships and an exporter xed e¤ect. He nds a negative correlation between exporter per
capita income and the xed e¤ect, implying that poor countries face higher variable trade costs
than rich countries. Following Waugh (2009), I examine a variation of the model when xed
costs of trade are identical across countries, while variable trade costs depend on the exporter
development level. That is, for i 6= j
fij = wifx and
 ij = 1 +
0
Zi
D
1
ij 
Bij
2 
LNGij
3 
NAFij
4 
EUij
5 .
Hence, if  is greater than zero, then other things equal, more developed countries tend to have
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Table 6: Alternative Specications: Trade Elasticities and Zeros
Dependent variable:
Data
lnTi
(1)
lnTi(^)
(2)
lnTi(^)
(3)
lnTi(^)
Log of GDP
0:85
(0:03)
0:69
(0:03)
0:69
(0:03)
0:68
(0:03)
Log of GDP per capita
0:19
(0:04)
0:22
(0:02)
0:24
(0:03)
0:49
(0:03)
Correctly predicted zeros: 100% 35% 36% 27%
Observations: 100 100 100 100
lower variable costs of trade. I then estimate the parameters f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; fx; g.
The third column in Table 5 reports the parameter estimates. The estimate of  is 0:22
meaning a strong negative correlation between variable costs of trade and country development
levels, which is consistent with the ndings in Waugh (2009). The explanatory power slightly
falls from 81% to 79%. However, this variation of the model considerably overestimates the
impact of per capita income on trade volumes (see the fourth column in Table 6). The model
predicts that controlling for the total income, doubling a country income per increases trade
volumes of that country by 49% (compared to 19% in the data). Moreover, the percentage
of correctly predicted zeros falls from 35% to 27% constituting larger mismatch between zeros
predicted by the model and those in the data.
Hence, while the relationship between variable costs of trade and development levels can also
account for greater trade volumes of richer countries and zero trade ows in the data, the model
in this case performs much worse in matching the trade elasticities and zeros in the data.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature analyzing the role of xed costs of trade in
explaining trade volumes. I show that an association between xed costs of trade and countries
development levels can qualitatively and quantitatively account for the relationship between per
capita income and trade volumes observed in the data and explain a number of zeros in bilateral
trade ows.
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There are several directions in which further research can be pursued. First, in the paper, the
association between market access costs and development levels is estimated to match the data
on aggregate trade volumes. It might seem desirable, however, to estimate this association using
micro-level ("independent") data and then to examine how much of the relationship between per
capita income and trade volumes is explained by the variation in xed costs of trade. Secondly, it
might be interesting to incorporate nonhomothetic preferences in the model. This would enable
us to capture the e¤ects of both consumer preferences and market access costs on trade volumes
in a general equilibrium framework. Finally, in the paper, I consider an environment where
countries trade only in a di¤erentiated good. This framework is more applicable to the case of
trade among rich countries. In particular, the setup of the model assumes away the possibility
that trade ows can be generated by di¤erences in factor endowments. To explain better trade
between countries with di¤erent factor endowments, we can extend the model by incorporating
the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory (see for example Bernard et al. (2007)). This would allow us
to analyze both intra-industry and inter-industry trade and, thereby, to improve the t of the
model. I leave all the issues discussed above for future work.
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Appendix A: Per Capita Income and Trade Volumes
In this section, I prove Proposition 1. The outline of the proof is as follows (see the details of
the proof in the subsections). Suppose that country 2 trades more in the equilibrium. Since
trade is balanced, country 2 imports more than country 1. That is,
PN
j>2Xj2 
PN
j>2Xj1. (27)
As total incomes in the countries are the same (w1L1 = w2L2), (27) immediately implies that
the price index in country 2 is higher than that in country 1: P2  P1. Next, I show that if
P2  P1 and the assumptions of the proposition hold, then country 1 exports more than country
2. This constitutes a contradiction, implying that country 1 trades strictly more than country
2 in the equilibrium. This stage of the proof has two steps.
Step 1: The free entry condition in (12) states that
fei =
NX
j=1
Pr (  ij)E ((ij()  fij) j  ij) .
Using the expression for ij() in (6) and dividing ij() by ij(ij), we obtain that
ij()
ij(ij)
=


ij
 1
()
ij() = ij(ij)


ij
 1
.
Taking into account that ij(ij) = fij , the free entry condition for country i can be rewritten
as follows:
NX
j=1
fij
fei
Z H
ij
 

ij
 1
  1
!
dG() = 1. (28)
Hence, condition (28) implies that for countries 1 and 2 (recall that countries 1 and 2 do not
trade with each other):
NX
j:j 6=2
f1j
fe1
Z H
1j
 

1j
 1
  1
!
dG() =
NX
j:j 6=1
f2j
fe2
Z H
2j
 

2j
 1
  1
!
dG(). (29)
Note that f1jfe1 is strictly less than or equal to
f2j
fe2
for all j = 1::N . This implies that at least for
some j, Z H
1j
 

1j
 1
  1
!
dG() >
Z H
2j
 

2j
 1
  1
!
dG().
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Otherwise, (29) does not hold. This implies that 1j < 2j for some j. I show that in fact,
1j < 2j for all j > 2 (see details in the next subsection). That is, country 1 has a higher
fraction of rms in the total mass of entrants exporting to country j for any j > 2.
Step 2: Next, I show that country 1 has higher exports to domestic sales ratio than country
2. This means that country 1 exports more than country 2, as total incomes of the countries
are the same. In the next subsection, I show that the result of the previous step and the fact
that f1jf11 is strictly less than
f2j
f22
for all j > 2 imply thatR H
1j
 1dG()R H
11
 1dG()
>
R H
2j
 1dG()R H
22
 1dG()
for all j > 2. (30)
As we assume that 1j = 2j for all j > 2, (30) implies thatPN
j>2

1
1j
 1 wjLj
P 1 j
R H
1j
 1dG()R H
11
 1dG()
>
PN
j>2

1
2j
 1 wjLj
P 1 j
R H
2j
 1dG()R H
22
 1dG()
.
Note that P2  P1 implies that w1L1P 1 1 
w2L2
P 1 2
. This in turn means that
PN
j>2

1
1j
 1 wjLj
P 1 j
R H
1j
 1dG()
w1L1
P 1 1
R H
11
 1dG()
>
PN
j>2

1
2j
 1 wjLj
P 1 j
R H
2j
 1dG()
w2L2
P 1 2
R H
22
 1dG()
,
which is equivalent to PN
j>2X1j
X11
>
PN
j>2X2j
X22
.
This nishes the proof. In the next sections, I provide the details of the proof.
Proof of Step 1
At this stage of the proof, I show that 1j < 2j for all j > 2. Specically, I rst show that if
1j < 2j for some j > 2, then 1j < 2j for all j > 2. Then, I prove that the equality (29)
implies that 1j < 2j at least for some j > 2. This nishes the proof.
From the zero prot condition (7),
ij =
wi
Zi
 ij
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1
f
1
 1
ij .
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Substituting for fij , the cuto¤s are given by
11 =
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1
C
P 1 1
w1L1
 1
 1
; (31)
22 =
w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1
C
P 1 2
w2L2
 1
 1
; (32)
ij =
wi
Zi
(wifd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

i
 1
 1
 ij
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1
for j > 2 and i = 1; 2. (33)
Given the expressions for the cuto¤s, it is straightforward to show that if 1j < 2j for some
j > 2, then
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
1j
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1
<
w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
2j
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1
.
As we assume that 1j = 2j for all j > 2, the last inequality implies that
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
<
w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
.
This in turn means that 1j < 2j for all j > 2.
To reduce the notation in this subsection, I denote
R H
ij


ij
 1   1 dG() as H(ij).
Notice that H 0(ij) < 0. Given the new notation, the equality (29) can be rewritten as follows
(recall that country 1 and 2 do not trade with each other):
NX
j>2
f1j
fe1
H(1j) +
f11
fe1
H(11) =
NX
j>2
f2j
fe2
H (2j) +
f22
fe2
H(22).
Substituting for fe1, fe2, f1j , f2j , f11, and f22 (see (11) and (10)), we have
fd
fe
+
fx
Z1
 NX
j>2
H(1j) +
fd
fe
H(11) =

fd
fe
+
fx
Z2
 NX
j>2
H (2j) +
fd
fe
H(22). (34)
To nish the proof, I consider w1Z1w
1
 1
1 and
w2
Z2
w
1
 1
2 . In general, we do not know whether
w1
Z1
w
1
 1
1 is greater or less than
w2
Z2
w
1
 1
2 in the equilibrium. Therefore, we need to examine two
cases. First, if w1Z1w
1
 1
1 <
w2
Z2
w
1
 1
2 , then (as Z1 > Z2),
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
<
w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
.
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From (33) and the fact that 1j = 2j , the last inequality results in that 1j < 2j for all j > 2.
Second, if w1Z1w
1
 1
1  w2Z2w
1
 1
2 , then (remember that w1L1 = w2L2, P2  P1, and  > 1)
11 =
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1
C
P 1 1
w1L1
 1
 1
 w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1
C
P 1 2
w2L2
 1
 1
= 22
Since H 0 () < 0, we obtain that
fd
fe
H(11)  fd
fe
H(22).
This means that in order for (34) holds, 1j should be strictly less than 2j for some j > 2,
implying that 1j < 2j for all j > 2 (see the considerations before).
Proof of Step 2
Here I show that in the equilibrium,R H
1j
 1dG()R H
11
 1dG()
>
R H
2j
 1dG()R H
22
 1dG()
for all j > 2. (35)
To prove this result, I need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 1 For any positive numbers A and B such that A  B, a function J(x) =
R H
Ax 
 1dG()R H
Bx 
 1dG()
is weakly decreasing in x.
Proof. The proof directly follows from di¤erentiating J(x). Namely, J 0(x)  0 if and only if
xg(x)R H
x t
 1dG(t)
is weakly increasing in x, which is assumed in the condition of the proposition.
Next, I use this lemma to show that (35) holds. To do so, we need to construct several
additional variables. Specically, we dene
x1 =
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
and
x2 =
w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
.
Note that the proof of Step 1 implies that x1 < x2 in the equilibrium (as 1j < 2j for all j > 2).
In addition, for arbitrary j > 2 we dene A = 1j

1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
 1
 1
and B =

1
C
P1 1
w1L1
 1
 1

1+ fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
. Recall
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that Assumption 2 says that 1j  11 for all j > 2. From (31) and (33), 1j  11 is equivalent
to
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
1j
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1
 w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1
C
P 1 1
w1L1
 1
 1
()
1j
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1


1
C
P 1 1
w1L1
 1
 1

1 + fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
.
The last inequality implies that A  B.
Next, I apply Lemma 1 for x1, x2, A, and B dened above. As x1 < x2, Lemma 1 implies
that J(x1)  J (x2) or R H
Ax1
 1dG()R H
Bx1
 1dG()

R H
Ax2
 1dG()R H
Bx2
 1dG()
. (36)
Note that from (31) and (33),
Ax1 =
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
1j
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1
= 1j ,
Bx1 =

1
C
P 1 1
w1L1
 1
 1

1 + fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
=
w1
Z1
(w1fd)
1
 1

1
C
P 1 1
w1L1
 1
 1
= 11.
Moreover, from (33) and the assumption that 1j = 2j ,
Ax2 = 1j
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1 w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
= 2j
 
1
C
P 1 j
wjLj
! 1
 1 w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
= 2j .
Summarizing the ndings above, we can rewrite (36) as follows:R H
Ax1
 1dG()R H
Bx1
 1dG()

R H
Ax2
 1dG()R H
Bx2
 1dG()
()
R H
1j
 1dG()R H
11
 1dG()

R H
2j
 1dG()R H
Bx2
 1dG()
. (37)
Finally, since P
1 
1
w1L1
 P
1 
2
w2L2
and 1+ fx
fdZ

1
< 1+ fx
fdZ

2
(this is implied by P2  P1 and Z1 > Z2),
Bx2 =

1
C
P 1 1
w1L1
 1
 1

1 + fx
fdZ

1
 1
 1
x2 >

1
C
P 1 2
w2L2
 1
 1

1 + fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
x2.
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From (32), 
1
C
P 1 2
w2L2
 1
 1

1 + fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
x2 =

1
C
P 1 2
w2L2
 1
 1

1 + fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
w2
Z2
(w2fd)
1
 1

1 +
fx
fdZ

2
 1
 1
= 22.
That is,
Bx2 > 22.
The last inequality and (37) immediately imply thatR H
1j
 1dG()R H
11
 1dG()
>
R H
2j
 1dG()R H
22
 1dG()
.
Since the choice of j was arbitrary, the last inequality holds for all j > 2.
Appendix B: Robustness Checks
In this part of the Appendix, I check the robustness of the quantitative implications of the model
to changes in the values of the unidentiable parameters. Namely, I reestimate the model xing
the parameters f; kg at di¤erent values. I do not report the e¤ects of changes in fL; H ; fe; fdg,
as they do not entirely a¤ect the explanatory power and quantitative implications of the model
(the generated trade elasticities and "true" zeros are the same as those predicted by the main
model).
I consider one by one changes in f; kg. That is, I change the value of one parameter
xing the others at the values set in the main body of the paper. In particular, I examine
the following changes:  falls from 3:8 to 3 and k rises from 3:4 to 4. Table 7 reports the
parameter estimates. As it can be seen, the changes in f; kg lead to the di¤erent estimates of
the parameters. However, the explanatory power remains the same. Table 8 shows the trade
elasticities and the percentage of "true" zeros predicted by the model. Given the new values of
f; kg, the model predicts the same e¤ect of population size on trade volumes as the main model
does, but somewhat amplies the impact of per capita income. Doubling a country income per
capita (keeping the total income unaltered) leads to an increase in trade volumes of 31% ( = 3)
and of 27% (k = 4), while the main model predicts a rise in trade volumes of 22%.
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Table 7: Robustness Checks: Parameter Estimates
Main Model Model: k = 4 Model:  = 3
0 0:49 0:20 0:40
1 0:14 0:18 0:15
2 0:76 0:67 0:69
3 0:97 0:95 0:96
4 0:78 0:69 0:67
5 0:94 0:90 0:85
fx 2:15 9:67 2:38
 0:67 0:65 0:49
R2 81% 81% 81%
Table 8: Robustness Checks: Trade Elasticities and Zeros
Dependent variable:
Data
lnTi
Main Model
lnTi(^)
Model:  = 3
lnTi(^)
Model: k = 4
lnTi(^)
Log of GDP
0:85
(0:03)
0:69
(0:03)
0:68
(0:03)
0:68
(0:03)
Log of GDP per capita
0:19
(0:04)
0:22
(0:02)
0:31
(0:03)
0:27
(0:03)
Correctly predicted zeros: 100% 35% 34% 35%
Observations: 100 100 100 100
8 Appendix C: Alternative Restrictions
In this section, I consider alternative restrictions in the estimation procedure. Specically, I
solve
min

P
i;j:i6=j
 
Xoij  Xij(Z(w;L;); L;)
2
subject to
(1  ")	T (Z(w;L;); L;) + "	F (Z(w;L;); L;) = 0,
where 	T (Z;L;) is the di¤erence between the number of correctly predicted zeros and the
number of zeros in the data and 	F (Z;L;) is the mismatch (zeros that are predicted by the
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Table 9: Alternative Restrictions: Parameter Estimates
The restriction: " = 0:5 " = 0:25 " = 0:75
0 0:49 0:40 0:55
1 0:14 0:14 0:14
2 0:76 0:72 0:77
3 0:97 0:97 0:98
4 0:78 0:78 0:78
5 0:94 0:95 0:95
fx 2:15 5:89 1:12
 0:67 0:64 0:64
R2 81% 80% 81%
model but not observed in the data). I consider two cases: " = 0:25 and " = 0:75. Recall that
in the main model, " = 0:5. Hence, the former case implies a lower weight attached to the
mismatch compared to the main model, while the latter implies a higher weight.
Table 9 reports the results. As it can be seen, the estimates of many parameters do not
change compared to the main model (the only substantial changes are in the estimates of 0
and fx). The explanatory power of the model does not change as well. Table 10 shows the
trade elasticities and the number of zero trade ows simulated by the model for the di¤erent
restrictions. As it can be inferred from the table, a lower weight attached to the mismatch
leads to much more zeros predicted by the model. If " = 0:25, then the model predicts 2607
zeros (compared to 1404 when " = 0:5). However, many of those zeros are "false" zeros. The
number of correctly predicted zeros is 796. Therefore, lower " increases both the number of
correctly predicted zeros and the mismatch. Similarly, higher " reduces both the mismatch
and the number of correctly predicted zeros (see the fourth column of Table 10). Finally, the
simulated trade elasticities are not much di¤erent from those obtained before.
Appendix D: Alternative Estimation Procedures
Another robustness check is to apply an alternative estimation procedure. The point is that non-
linear least squares (NLLS) attach greater weights to observations with higher values. Therefore,
if high value observations have larger variance, then non-linear least squares may lead to inef-
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Table 10: Alternative Restrictions: Trade Elasticities and Zeros
Dependent variable:
Data
lnTi
" = 0:5
lnTi(^)
" = 0:25
lnTi(^)
" = 0:75
lnTi(^)
Log of GDP
0:85
(0:03)
0:69
(0:03)
0:68
(0:03)
0:70
(0:03)
Log of GDP per capita
0:19
(0:04)
0:22
(0:02)
0:31
(0:03)
0:17
(0:03)
Total number of zeros:
Correctly predicted zeros:
1399
1399
1404
497
2607
796
604
207
cient estimates. I examine two alternative estimation procedures: restricted non-linear least
deviations (NLLD) and restricted non-linear least squares applied to logarithms rather than
levels (NLLS(log)). Both of these procedures attach lower weights to high value observations
compared to the procedure used in the paper.
In the case of non-linear least deviations we solve the following minimization problem:
min

P
i;j:i6=j
Xoij  Xij(Z(w;L;); L;)
subject to
	(Z(w;L;); L;) = 0.
While non-linear least squares applied to logarithms imply that the estimate of  solves
min

P
i;j:i6=j
 
log(Xoij + 1)  log (Xij(Z(w;L;); L;) + 1)
2
subject to
	(Z(w;L;); L;) = 0.
Notice that we cannot directly convert to logarithms, as there are zeros in the data. Therefore,
I use another monotonic transformation. Specically, instead of log(Xoij) I consider log(X
o
ij+1).
This solves the problem of zeros. Moreover, if Xoij is equal to zero, then log

Xoij + 1

is equal
to zero as well.
Table 11 reports the parameter estimates obtained by applying NLLD and NLLS(log) (the
rst column of the table shows the non-linear least squares estimates). The results of the
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Table 11: Alternative Estimation Procedures: Parameter Estimates
Estimation procedure: NLLS NLLD NLLS(log)
0 0:49 0:60 0:58
1 0:14 0:17 0:17
2 0:76 0:73 0:71
3 0:97 0:86 0:85
4 0:78 0:63 0:69
5 0:94 0:82 0:92
fx 2:15 1:35 1:24
 0:67 0:62 0:66
R2 81% 44% 81%
Table 12: Alternative Estimation Procedures: Trade Elasticities and Zeros
Dependent variable:
Data
lnTi
NLLS
lnTi(^)
NLLD
lnTi(^)
NLLS(log)
lnTi(^)
Log of GDP
0:85
(0:03)
0:69
(0:03)
0:63
(0:03)
0:63
(0:03)
Log of GDP per capita
0:19
(0:04)
0:22
(0:02)
0:33
(0:03)
0:30
(0:03)
Correctly predicted zeros: 100% 35% 34% 35%
Observations: 100 100 100 100
both procedures imply a negative correlation between country development levels and market
access costs. Moreover, the estimates of  are close to that obtained by applying NLLS. The
estimates of  vary from 0:62 (NLLD) to 0:66 (NLLS(log)), while NLLS result in  equal to
0:67. The estimates of the other parameters do not vary considerably as well. Table 12 shows
the comparison of the simulated trade elasticities obtained by applying di¤erent estimation
procedures. As it can be inferred, the model estimated by NLLD and NLLS(log) slightly reduces
the e¤ect of population size on trade volumes and amplies the impact of per capita income
compared to the model estimated by NLLS. Finally, all procedures result in the same percentage
of correctly predicted zeros.
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Figure 1: Trade vs GDP in 1995 (the 100 largest countries in terms of GDP)
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Figure 2: Residuals vs GDP per capita and population size
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Table 13: List of Countries
Country name GDP per capita (2000US$) GDP (2000US$ billion)
United States 29942 7972.80
Japan 35439 4445.37
Germany 21073 1720.46
United Kingdom 21160 1232.58
France 19990 1156.29
Italy 17565 998.50
China, Hong Kong 777 941.32
Canada 20170 592.06
Brazil 3613 583.91
Spain 12056 474.85
Mexico 4892 445.85
Korea Republic 9159 413.01
India 372 346.57
Australia 18267 330.12
Netherlands 20427 315.81
Argentina 7184 250.26
Russian Federation 1618 239.71
Switzerland 31614 222.60
Belgium, Luxemburg 20672 218.01
Sweden 23374 206.42
Austria 21088 167.72
Turkey 2666 164.60
Indonesia 827 159.38
Norway 32214 140.45
Denmark 26599 139.06
Poland 3411 131.63
Greece 11445 121.71
Thailand 2086 120.01
Venezuela 5120 112.85
Finland 18899 96.54
Israel 17246 95.63
Portugal 9196 92.21
Iran 1409 83.07
Colombia 2092 80.04
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Table 13: List of Countries (continued)
Country name GDP per capita (2000US$) GDP (2000US$ billion)
Egypt 1278 77.51
Malaysia 3471 71.47
Singapore 19359 68.23
Pakistan 515 63.00
Philippines 913 62.59
Chile 4295 61.82
Ireland 16799 60.62
Czech Republic 5100 52.69
Peru 1976 47.13
Algeria 1662 46.96
NewZealand 12635 46.41
Nigeria 363 39.54
Romania 1742 39.50
Hungary 3812 39.37
Bangladesh 289 36.54
Ukraine 672 34.60
Kuwait 19048 34.33
Morocco 1160 30.66
Uruguay 5786 18.62
Syrian Arab Republic 1181 17.26
Slovak Republic 3174 17.03
Oman 7749 16.83
Kazakhstan 1023 16.18
Guatemala 1589 15.89
Croatia 3337 15.58
Slovenia 7828 15.58
Ecuador 1335 15.21
Lebanon 4245 14.82
Tunisia 1651 14.79
Dominican Republic 1694 13.58
Bulgaria 1564 13.14
SriLanka 704 12.77
Costa Rica 3608 12.54
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Table 13: List of Countries (continued)
Country name GDP per capita (2000US$) GDP (2000US$ billion)
Kenya 417 11.42
Uzbekistan 500 11.39
ElSalvador 2006 11.30
Belarus 920 9.38
Lithuania 2561 9.30
Panama 3470 9.27
Sudan 307 9.06
CotedIvoire 596 8.93
Jamaica 3241 8.04
Cameroon 568 7.99
Cyprus 11870 7.73
Tanzania 249 7.43
Jordan 1723 7.23
Yemen Rep. 465 7.22
Zimbabwe 606 7.15
Paraguay 1488 7.14
Bolivia 948 7.09
Iceland 25489 6.83
Angola 544 6.70
Bahrain 11170 6.45
Trinidad and Tobago 5037 6.40
Latvia 2364 5.95
Dem.Rep. Congo 116 5.26
Honduras 921 5.13
Gabon 4737 5.00
Nepal 200 4.34
Uganda 203 4.32
Estonia 2986 4.29
Bahamas 14477 4.06
Ghana 225 4.03
Senegal 424 3.84
Azerbaijan 488 3.75
Mauritius 3064 3.44
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